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NEW YORK'S CHILD ABUSE LAWS: INADEQUACIES
IN THE PRESENT STATUTORY STRUCTURE
Mistreatment of children is not a new phenomenon, but public
and legislative concern for the victims of parental abuse has become
significant only recently.' In response to the growing awareness of the
seriousness of this problem, a large volume of recent state legislation
attempts to afford some protection to children whose safety is in danger.2 The primary focus of legislation has been on reporting incidents
of child abuse, reflecting the conviction that no program of child protection can succeed unless there is first a means of discovering cases in
which abuse may be present. 3 No less important, however, is the judicial and social machinery that comes into play once the discovery is
made to bring about a result in the best interests of all parties.
New York, like other states, has enacted reporting legislation. 4
Until mid-1969 the role of the New York courts in cases of child mistreatment was defined solely by a "neglected child" statute, article 3
of the Family Court Act.5 Under this statute a "neglect proceeding"
can be brought in the Family Court, where the court can grant a variety of remedies. In June 1969, however, a child abuse law aimed
explicitly at children suffering serious physical harm became effective. 6
The act created a new child abuse proceeding in the Family Court,
distinct from the neglect proceeding. It did not repeal, modify, or
make any reference to the article 3 neglect proceeding but added a
new article 10 to the Family Court Act, apparently with the intention
that the two should somehow coexist. Their coexistence leaves serious
1 Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 CoLUm. L. REv. 679 (1966).
For an inter-disciplinary overview of the problem of the physically abused child, see
THE BATrEEm CHiLD (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968).
2 Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 CoLumn.
L. RFv. 1 (1967).
3 Paulsen, supra note 1, at 710.
4 N.Y. Soc. SERvIcEs LAW § 383-a (McKinney Supp. 1969). This section also provides
for local and statewide central registers. Mandatory reporting was first established in
New York by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 483-d (McKinney 1964), N.Y. Laws 1964, ch. 811,
§ 483-d (repealed 1965).
5 N.Y. FAMLY CT. AcT art. 3 (McKinney 1963). "Neglected child" statutes are a
common means of handling child abuse cases. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 693-94.
Criminal sanctions for "endangering the welfare of a child" are provided by N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1967), but they are not generally considered an adequate
solution to the problem. See Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE BAT-rmE
CHuD, supra note 1, at 176.
6 N.Y. FAMILY Or. Acr art. 10 (McKinney Supp. 1969). See notes 19-24 and accompanying text infra.
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uncertainties as to the role each is to play in serving their common
purpose, the protection of children.
I
THE STATUTORY SCHEME

Article 3 of the Family Court Act was enacted in 1962 as part of
the consolidation of the Children's Court and the Domestic Relations
Court into the Family Court.7 The purpose of the neglect proceeding
is to protect children who receive inadequate parental care, suffer
harm from improper guardianship, or are deserted,8 and the definition
of "neglected child" is accordingly broad. The physically abused child
is not specifically included in this definition but is treated by the courts
as falling within its general language. 9
Article 3 empowers the Family Court to adjudicate cases of alleged neglect and dispose of them in several ways. A proceeding is
initiated by filing a petition alleging that the child is "neglected"
within the terms of the article. 10 Before or after filing, the court," and
in extreme cases a peace officer, 12 can remove the child from his home
if there is imminent danger to the child's safety. The court can issue
a warrant to compel attendance and production of the child.' 3 After
a fact-finding hearing14 and a dispositional hearing 5 the court, if it
finds neglect, can suspend judgment, discharge the child to the custody
7 Governor's Memorandum of Approval of Laws of 1962, in N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr at
xxiii (McKinney 1963).
8 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 311 (McKinney 1963):
This article is designed to provide a due process of law for determining whether
a child is neglected and for so regulating a neglected child's home or, if necessary, removing him from his home that his needs are properly cared for. This
act is not intended to diminish the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the children's court or the domestic relations court with respect to neglected children.
9 Id. § 312. Section 312(b) includes in the definition of "neglected" child one "who
suffers or is likely to suffer serious harm from the improper guardianship, including lack
of moral supervision or guidance, of his parents or other person legally responsible for his
care and requires the aid of the court ... "Physical abuse has been treated as being covered
by this definition. See, e.g., In re Young, 50 Misc. 2d 271, 270 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Family Ct.
1966); In re S, 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1965).
259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1965).
10 N.Y. FAMILy CT. Aar § 331 (McKinney 1963). Section 332 states who may originate the proceeding.
11 Id. § 322 (before filing of petition); id. § 327 (after filing).
12 Id. § 321 (with parental consent); id. § 324 (without parental consent).
IS Id. § 337.

14 Id. § 344 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
15 Id. § 345 (McKinney 1963).
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of his parents or other suitable persons, or place the child. 16 In addi-

tion the court can issue an order of protection setting forth particular
conditions to be followed. 17 The court has sufficient flexibility to pro-

tect the child while still giving due consideration to preserving the
family unit. 8
New article 10 of the Family Court Act is more limited in scope;
its stated purpose' 9 is to protect children who have suffered serious
physical abuse.20 A child abuse proceeding bears' substantial resem-

blance to a neglect proceeding, although article 10 provides less certainty in its operational aspects. The article creates a special "child
abuse part" of Family Court to handle such cases. 21 A proceeding is

commenced by filing a petition, 22 and involves a hearing to determine
the validity of the allegations. 23 If the court finds that all the allega16 Id. §§ 352(a), (c); id. § 352(b) (McKinney Supp. 1969). See also id. § 353 (McKinney 1963) (suspended judgment), id. § 354 (discharge), and id. § 355 (placement). The
court can dismiss the petition even if it finds neglect if it also finds that its aid is not
required. Id. § 351.
17 Id. § 356 (McKinney 1963). See note 43 infra.
18 Placement of the child is not always the best solution. If the court finds that the
child needs protection but his home life can still be preserved, it can resort to suspended
judgment or discharge and orders of protection to safeguard the child while leaving the
family intact. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT §§ 352, 853, 354, 356 (McKinney 1963).
19 Id. § 1011 (McKinney Supp. 1969):
This article is designed to establish proceedings for the protection of children
under sixteen years of age who have had serious physical injury inflicted upon
them by other than accidental means. It is intended by the addition of this
article to assure that the lives of innocent children are safeguarded from further injury and possible death and that the legal rights of such children are
fully protected.
20 Section 1012 defines an abused child as a child under the age of sixteen years
who has had serious physical or mental injury inflicted upon him by other than
accidental means or who is in the care and custody of a parent or other person
who has been adjudicated a narcotic addict.
The reference to "mental injury" makes the definition somewhat confusing in light of
§ 1011's statement of purpose. See note 19 supra.
21 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1013(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969):
Such part shall be held separate from all other proceedings of the court, and
shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings originating in or transferred to such
court relating to abused children, and shall be charged with the immediate
protection of such child.
22 Although § 1014 enumerates the persons who may originate a proceeding, and
§ 1015, § 1019, and §1022 refer to the filing of a petition, article 10 contains no provision
dealing directly with the petition or its filing comparable to article 3's clear statement in

§ 331.
23 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 1017 (McKinney Supp. 1969). This section incorporates
parts 3 and 4 of N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr article 8 (McKinney 1963) (family offenses proceedings), dealing with hearings and orders, "[t]o the extent that the same may apply
or be made applicable in order to fully effectuate the purposes of this article .
Id.
§ 1017 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

1970]
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tions of the petition are established, the court must order removal of
24
the child from his home.
II
PROBLEMS OF COEXISTENCE
Because all types of child mistreatment, including physical abuse,
were formerly handled under article 3, some doubt arises as to how
articles 3 and 10 are now to operate. A number of inconsistencies
between the articles make it quite unlikely that both could be used
in the same case. For example, the child abuse proceeding is to be
conducted by the special child abuse part of Family Court, while the
neglect proceeding is not so limited. Since the child abuse part is to be
held independently of all other proceedings and is to have jurisdiction
over all proceedings relating to abused children, it is reasonable to
conclude that article 10 alone should control such proceedings. 25
24 Id. § 102g. The legislation adds a number of innovations other than the new
proceeding to New York law. Section 1015 requires service of a specially marked summons
on the child's parent or guardian within 24 hours and, if this falls, directs the court to issue
a warrant. Section 1016 provides that the child is to be represented at all stages of the
proceeding by a police attorney in New York City, or the district attorney or assistant
district attorney elsewhere. Section 1018 provides that hospitals, social services districts,
and other agencies must make all records, photographs, or other evidence available to the
court on request, and § 1023 requires that all records regarding child abuse be forwarded
to the child abuse part of the Family Court within 24 hours of receipt. Section 1019 allows
temporary removal when the child is residing with a narcotics addict. Section 1020
provides for compulsory medical examination of the child. Section 1024 requires court
clerks to obtain social security numbers for children involved.
In addition to adding article 10, chapter 264 adds to N.Y. Soc. SERvicES LAw § 383-a
(McKinney Supp. 1969) by extending the mandatory reporting duty beyond the medical
profession to social services workers and school officials. New § 383-c empowers doctors
to take temporary custody of abused children. A separate act (N.Y. Laws 1969, ch. 763)
adds to § 383-a the provision that a person in charge of a hospital can retain custody
of a child reported to be abused until the next regular session of that part of the
Family Court in which an article 3 neglect proceeding may be commenced. It requires
that a social services official commence such an action.
The legislature enacted chapter 264 in rapid fashion, in a heated atmosphere of
public opinion aroused by the case of Roxanne Felumero, a little girl removed from
her New York City home after a neglect proceeding in 1966. In December 1968 she was
returned to her mother, after which a second neglect proceeding was commenced. The
proceeding dragged on until March 24, when the child was found dead in the East River,
allegedly killed by her stepfather. Controversy ensued over the inefficient handling of
the case. The Judiciary Relations Committee of the Appellate Division, First Department, investigated and issued a comprehensive report, with criticisms and recommendations. The report was published in four parts in 161 N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1969, at 1, col.
4; 162 N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1969, at 1, col. 4; id., July 2, 1969, at 1, col. 4; id., July 3, 1969,
at 1, col. 4.
25 See N.Y. FAMILY CT. Act § 1013 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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In the neglect proceeding the child is to be represented by a law
guardian appointed by the court if the court so orders,26 whereas under article 10 the abused child is to be represented by a police attorney
or assistant district attorney assigned to the child abuse part. 27 Again,

this procedural difference makes concurrent operation unwieldy. A
proceeding would have to be under either one article or the other to
permit representation by a single attorney unless courts ignore the
statutory distinction and allow representation by either type of attorney under each article.
Another point of difference lies in the degree of flexibility allowed
the judge who finds all the allegations of the petition established. In
a neglect proceeding, the judge has alternatives ranging from suspending judgment to removing and placing the child. 28 In an article 10
proceeding, however, if the judge finds abuse, he must order removal
and placement.2 9 If concurrent operation were granted, the judge
would be free to choose any of the options offered by article 3, nullifying the mandatory removal provision of article 10. Finally, to provide for hearings and orders other than removal in the event physical
abuse is not found, article 10 incorporates by reference parts of article
8, dealing with family offenses (assaults between members of a family),
rather than the hearing and order provisions of article 3.30 In view of
this legislative scheme it is highly unlikely that concurrent application
of articles 3 and 10 was contemplated.
If articles 3 and 10 are independent of each other, as indicated by
the lack of any attempt in the latter to coordinate them, serious uncertainty arises. Article 3 covers broadly what article 10 now covers
specifically.31 It is not clear whether article 3's coverage is altered by
the recent statute. One interpretation is that article 10 is a specialized
proceeding falling within article 3's broad coverage; under this view
26 Id. § 348 (McKinney 1963). Section 249, in reference to article 3, states that the
court shall appoint a law guardian to represent the child if so requested by child or
parent and if counsel is not otherwise available to the child and that the court may
make such an appointment on its own motion.
27 Id. § 1016 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
28 Id. § 352 (McKinney 1963).
29 Id. § 1022 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
30 Id. § 1017. This section incorporates the hearing and order provisions of article
8 "[t]o the extent that the same may apply or be made applicable in order to fully
effectuate the purposes of this article .... " Id. Although this section does not explicitly
state that these orders are available only if physical abuse is not found, such a conclusion is a necessary corollary of the mandate of § 1022, which states that if the court
finds physical abuse it "shall enter an order directing the removal of such child from
his home."
31 See note 9 supra.
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an article 10 proceeding would be able to benefit from the provisions
of article 3 as well as from its own.
Article 10, however, probably narrows the coverage of article 3
by preempting the field of physical abuse. It is unlikely that a case
clearly involving serious physical abuse will now be handled under.
the neglect provisions, since article 10 provides that the new child
abuse part is to have jurisdiction of all cases relating to abused children.32 Article 3 covers all other forms of parental mistreatment. 33
From another viewpoint, article 10 may repeal by implication that
part of article 's coverage relating to physical abuse.3 4 Either way,
article 3s coverage would be narrowed by the coverage assumed by
article 10.
This might seem a neat solution to the overlap of articles 3 and
10; in fact it compounds the difficulties. It makes the powers and processes of the two proceedings mutually exclusive and raises the problem of the borderline case. Cases coming before the Family Court must
be classified as neglect proceedings under article 3 or abuse proceedings under article 10. In situations that can reasonably be classified
either way, the decision may prevent the attainment of the best judi35

cial solution.

A second area of uncertainty concerns the powers and procedures
for temporarily removing the child from his home, pending final determination of his case, when his safety is seriously endangered. Article
3 contains comprehensive provisions for temporary removal both before and after the filing of a petition.3 6 Article 10, on the other hand,
32 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 1013 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
33 An exception to this generalization is that a child "who is in the care and custody
of a parent or other person who has been adjudicated a narcotic addict" is by definition
an abused child. Id. § 1012.
Under general principles of statutory construction, statutes are to be construed so
as to be consistent with each other if at all possible. 1 McKINNEY, STATUTES § 391 (1942);
1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION 468-70 (3d ed. F. Horack ed. 1943).
If article 3 were still treated as covering cases of physical abuse, there would be numerous conflicting provisions relating to such mistreatment. A construction limiting
article 3 to mistreatment other than physical abuse allows each article to operate fully
in its own area of coverage.
34 See MCKINNEY, supra note 33, § 391.
35 For example, a child may exhibit physical injuries that may have been caused
by physical abuse or by parental neglect in leaving the child unsupervised under conditions that posed a danger to the child's safety. If the case is classed as one of child
abuse, with article 10 controlling, the court cannot order the child removed from his
home until and unless it finds that the injuries are the result of physical abuse. If
article 3 controls, however, the court can offer this form of protection. See the discussion
of remedial powers of the two articles, text at notes 36-47 &-note 45 infra.
36 See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text. Sections 323, 325, and 326 concern
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is conspicuously devoid of any provisions dealing with temporary removal except for one dealing with children living with narcotic addicts .3 7 The result is a serious gap in the protection article 10 purports
to offer abused children. The legislature could not reasonably have
intended to deny the court the power of temporary removal in physical abuse cases when that power was fully available under the neglect
article, and a source of that power must be found.38 To find any authority for the exercise of such power, however, the court must look
to article 3, raising again the problems of applying articles 3 and 10
concurrently. Perhaps in practice judges will ignore the statutory dichotomy and integrate the two articles into an efficient child protective system, but this does not seem to be the most sensible or the most
effective way to approach the problem. Integration by judicial interpretation necessarily proceeds on a case-by-case basis; in the interim
the need for temporary removal powers remains unsatisfied.
A third area of doubt arising from the coexistence of the two
articles concerns the disposition of a case after hearing. Under either
article, after the hearings are completed and it has been determined
whether a child is neglected or abused, the judge is empowered to
issue orders as the final disposition of the case. Articles 3 and 10 differ
in the variety of such orders available, and again it is article 10 that
contains a gap.
Under article 3 the judge can dismiss the petition if no neglect is
found,39 suspend judgment, 40 discharge the child to the custody of his
parents or other suitable persons, 41 or place the child outside his
home.42 In addition to any of the above orders, he can issue an order
of protection. 43 Under article 10 the judge must remove and place the
procedures, and § 328 allows application by parent for return of child. The court can
order temporary removal before or after filing if there is imminent danger to the child's
safety (N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 332 (McKinney 1963)), and such an order can also be
made after filing if it is likely that the child will be found neglected and the order
will be placement. Id. § 327.
37 N.Y. FAMmY CT. AcT § 1019 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
8 Some language of article 10 indicates that a power of temporary removal is
needed. See id. § 1011, quoted in note 19 supra, and id. § 1013, which states that the
child abuse part "shall be charged with the immediate protection of such child." But
§ 1011 and § 1013 seem inadequate to confer the power upon the court, since under
article 3 the power is authorized not by a general grant but by a number of specific,
detailed provisions.
39 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 351 (McKinney 1963).
40 Id. §§ 352(a), 353.
41 Id. §§ 352(b), 354.
42 Id. §§ 352(c), 355.
43 Id. § 356. An order of protection can set forth certain conditions to be followed
by a child's parent or guardian, or spouse of the parent or guardian, for a specified
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child if he finds serious physical abuse. 44 The judge is left no discretion in dealing with cases where abuse is found but removal does not
appear necessary. 45 Where no abuse is found, the judge can dismiss the
petition, suspend judgment, place the respondent on probation, or
make an order of protection, 46 but he can only return the child to his
47
home or place him in the home of a relative.
If in a child abuse proceeding the judge finds no physical abuse,
but finds that the child has been seriously mistreated in some other
way, he should not be denied the authority to remove and place the
child if this seems the only adequate solution. Removal might be
appropriate in a case where there has been no physical abuse as yet but
the pattern of mistreatment is such that there is likelihood of serious
physical abuse in the future. If the judge were free to reach into article 3, he would have the power. But if the judge were intended to
have this freedom, it is unlikely that the legislature would have incorporated provisions of article 8, rather than those of article 3, into
article 10.
CONCLUSION

In view of the uncertainties generated by the coexistence of articles 3 and 10, it is questionable whether article 10 contributes substantially to child protection. Many of article 10's provisions might be
valuable tools in protecting against child abuse. 48 But until they are
more effectively coordinated with those of article 3, article 10 is something less than a solution to the problem of child abuse.
Jack L. Smith
time. The order may require such person to stay away from the home, spouse, or child;
to abstain from offensive conduct against the child or the other parent or guardian;
to give proper attention to the care of the home; and to refrain from acts that tend to
make the home not a proper place for the child. It may also award visitation rights to
either parent and give custody to either parent or a relative within the second degree.
44 Id. § 1022 (McKinney Supp. 1969). This section states that the court shall order
removal and placement, after a hearing on all the allegations of the petition, "if the
court shall determine that such allegations are established." Since the article nowhere
states what is to be contained or alleged in such a petition, the mandate is rather
indefinite.
45 The parts of article 8 incorporated into article 10 include some dispositional
powers similar to those of article 3 (see note 23 supra), but in an article 10 proceeding
these incorporated powers can logically be used only if the court determines that physical abuse is not present, since if it is present the court must order removal and placement. Note 30 supra.
46 N.Y. FAMnLY Cr. Acr § 851 (McKinney 1963); id. § 1017 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

47 See id. § 842 (McKinney 1963).
48 E.g., id. §§ 1015, 1016, 1018, 1020, 1023, 1024 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

